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Finding the Parameters: The Scope
of Arbitration Agreements in




There is perhaps no better indicator of the general perception of "crisis" in
the American medical system than the lavish attention given President Clinton's
health care reform initiatives in the media.2 In the 1970s, the frequency of
medical malpractice claims and the cost of malpractice insurance, two sources of
this perceived crisis, came into sharp focus.3 Experiencing a decline in profits as
a result of increased malpractice litigation, many insurers began refusing to
provide coverage or demanding high premium increases.4 This created a problem
in malpractice insurance availability to health care providers.5 Health care
providers, insurers, and state legislatures responded with a variety of reforms,6
some of which aimed to curb the frequency and cost of malpractice controversies
through the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration.7
Private agreements to arbitrate controversies signed before the injury occurred
became increasingly prevalent in contracts for medical services, 8 and were
parallelled by legislative initiatives aimed at facilitating and regulating their use.9
1. 16 Cal Rptr. 2d 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
2. See, e.g., Clinton's Trillion Dollar Cure (And What He Didn't Tell You), NEWsWEEK, Oct
4, 1993, at 28. Most of this issue is devoted to the health care debate and reports the following
statistics from a poll conducted on September 23-24, 1993: 16% of Americans surveyed believe the
health care system in this country requires only minor changes, 32% believe it requires fundamental
changes, and 47% believe it needs to be completely rebuilt Id. at 34.
3. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and
a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499, 502-03 (1989). See also Maureen Dulen,
Comment, Twenty Years Later... Contractual Arbitration as Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 1992
J. DIsP. RESOL 325, 325-26.
4. See Bovbjerg, supra note 3, at 502-03.
S. Id.
6. Id. at 513.
7. Id. at 522. See also Dulen, supra note 3, at 326; David M. Ward, Note, The Scope of Binding
Arbitration Agreements in ContractsforMedical Services, 8 OHIo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 361, 362-65
(1993).
8. See generally supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
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The philosophy behind arbitration was to provide the parties an alternative forum
that is less complicated, less expensive, less public, and more expeditious.' o The
process was also thought to be potentially more flexible and better suited to
meeting the needs of the parties."
Yet controversy rages concerning the fairness of legislative attempts to
facilitate and encourage arbitration agreements in medical service contracts.' 2
For example, an editorial in the October, 1993, issue of The Missouri Trial
Attorney characterized California's legislation dealing with arbitration agreements
as providing for the "[miandatory arbitration of malpractice claims if the health
care provider can trick patients into waiving their right to trial by jury."'3 This
Note will explore the scope of arbitration agreements in medical service contracts
in California, a state which took the lead in using legislation to encourage
arbitration of medical malpractice disputes.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jerri Pietrelli signed a contract agreeing to submit to arbitration any disputes
regarding medical services between herself and the defendant, Doctor Gordon
Peacock (Dr. Peacock).' 4 The document, entitled Arbitration Agreement,
included, in part, the following language: "Any controversy between me and
Doctor concerning medical care and any such controversy between Doctor and
persons, born or unborn, on behalf of whom I have the power to contract shall be
submitted to FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION in accordance with the
procedure set out in Article 2 below."" Ms. Pietrelli, who was not pregnant at
the time she signed the agreement, subsequently became pregnant and received
obstetric care from Dr. Peacock. 16
The plaintiff, Robert Pietrelli (Pietrelli), was born in October of 1982, and
brought this medical malpractice suit against Dr. Peacock, through his mother as
guardian ad litem, in September, 1990." Pietrelli alleged that he received
negligent medical care and treatment from Dr. Peacock at or around the time of
his birth.'" Dr. Peacock filed a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the
agreement between himself and Ms. Pietrelli.'9 Pietrelli opposed the motion by
arguing that he was not a party to the agreement because, being unconceived, he
10. LEONARD L. RISKN & JAMES E. WESTBPOOK, DISPTE RESOLUTION FOR LAWYERS 297
(1987).
11. Id.
12. Michael W. Manners, AffCRA: Model or Lesson?, Mo. TRIAL Ar'Y, Oct 1993, at 4.
13. Id.
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was not a legal entity at the time of the contract and could not be bound by it."
The trial court denied Dr. Peacock'spetition, finding that the arbitration agreement
"did not bind children not yet conceived at the time" of signing, and "that
reference to 'persons, born or unborn,' [in the contract] did not pertain to those
not yet conceived."'"
The California Court of Appeals reversed.22 Referring to California's
"strong public policy favoring arbitration over litigation," the court found there to
be "no question" that the services which were the subject of the action fell within
the parameters of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1295.' The court noted that
Section 1295 is included in the State's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
[hereinafter MICRA], the purpose of which is to encourage and facilitate
arbitration of medical malpractice disputes.24
The court also found that Pietrelli was an unborn person within the meaning
of the agreement, even though he was unconceived at the time it was made.25
First, the court determined that the usual and ordinary meaning of the language
used, and circumstances under which the agreement was made, indicated the intent
of Ms. Pietrelli to bind herself and her unborn, and presumably unconceived,
children.26 Second, the court found that a parent's power and authority to bind
a minor or expected child to an arbitration agreement is implied from his or her
duties and rights as the child's guardian.27 Finally, the court compared other
situations where the law recognizes the ability of a party to act on behalf of, and
affect the rights of, persons who have not yet come into existence.28  The court
determined that a child, not yet conceived, can nevertheless be bound to an
agreement which determines its rights to recover for injuries caused by the
wrongful or negligent act of another at or prior to birth, although those rights do
not accrue until the child is born alive.29 The order denying Dr. Peacock's
petition was reversed with directions to compel arbitration under the terms of the
contract.3 °
20. Id. at 690.
21. Id. at 689.
22. Id. at 691.
23. Id. at 689.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 691.
26. Id. at 690.
27. Id. at 689.
28. Id. at 690.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 691.
1994]
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H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1975, California Governor Edmund Brown called an "extraordinary"
session of the state legislature to "deal exclusively with the formulation of a
legislative solution to the 'crises"' in medical malpractice.3 One solution that
the Governor asked the legislature to consider was arbitration. 32 During the
session, the legislature approved MICRA, one part of which was Section 1295 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.33 Section 1295 encourages and facilitates
arbitration in medical malpractice disputes by specifying a standardized language
and format of arbitration clauses within a medical service contract. 4 It also
provides that if a contract complies with the provisions of the statute, it shall be
deemed neither a contract of adhesion nor unconscionable, and will be enforced
by the courts.35
This statute paralleled the efforts of medical care providers to privately
channel disputes into arbitration by including arbitration clauses in their medical
service contracts. 6 It also reinforced an existing trend in judicial opinions
treating such clauses favorably.3"
In the 1965 case of Doyle v. Giuliucci,3" the Supreme Court of California
held that a parent can "bind his child to arbitrate by entering into a contract of
which the child is a third party beneficiary."39 The court found that a parent's
power to enter into a medical service contract on behalf of his or her child was
implicit in the parent's right and duty to provide and care for the child." The
court further noted that unless contracts made on behalf of the child unreasonably
restrict the minor's rights, they should be sustained.
41
The Doyle court gave several reasons for its holding. First, noting that
children can usually disaffirm their own contracts, it seemed "unlikely that medical
groups would contract directly with them." '42 Thus, according to the court's
reasoning, children could be assured the benefits of group medical service only if
their parents had the power to contract on their behalf.43 Second, the court found
that arbitration provisions in medical service contracts were not an unreasonable
restriction on the rights of the minor because they only specified the forum in




34. See CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
35. Id. § 1295(e).
36. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965).
38. 401 P.2d 1.
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which the dispute would be heard, and did not determine the substantive rights of
the parties." Third, the court cited "safeguards," including the appointment of
a guardian ad litem, that exist in the arbitration process to protect the child's
claims.
45
In the 1976 case of Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,46 the
California Supreme Court held that an employer acting as an agent for its
employees had the implied authority to agree to a medical services contract
containing an arbitration clause for the employees.47 Citing Doyle, the court
noted the parallel argument that "both parent and agent serve as fiduciaries," and
that implicit in both functions was an implied authority to agree to arbitration of
potential claims.48 The court concluded that arbitration is a "proper and usual"
means of resolving malpractice disputes, and therefore, it was well within the
agent's power to effect the purpose of his agency.49
While noting that Section 1295 does not govern provisions in group care
contracts (as opposed to individual medical services contracts), the Madden court
pointed out that by enacting the statute, the legislature acknowledged "arbitration
as a means of resolving malpractice disputes. '" This further supported the
court's finding of a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an accepted and
favored method of resolving disputes and relieving overburdened civil dockets."
The Madden court also set about defining some parameters to its willingness
to enforce arbitration clauses. While rejecting the plaintiffs claim that the
contract containing the clause was a contract of adhesion, the court suggested that
it might be unwilling to enforce an arbitration clause in a medical service contract
imposed by a party of superior bargaining power, especially where the weaker
party lacked the opportunity to bargain and look elsewhere for a more favorable
contract.5 2 The court wanted to avoid situations that would force an individual
to "either adhere to a standardized agreement or forego the needed service.""
In this case, however, the contract was negotiated by the health care provider and
the Board of Administration of the State Employees Retirement System, parties
of equal bargaining power. 4 Furthermore, the plaintiff had "the opportunity to
select from among several medical plans negotiated and offered by the Board,




46. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).
47. Id. at 1184.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1184 n.9.
51. Id. at 1182.
52. Id. at 1182-83.
53. Id. at 1183.
54. Id. al 1185.
55. Id at 1186.
19941
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Barring a situation where such unconscionable circumstances might be
present, California courts did not act restrictively with regard to the scope of
arbitration clauses in medical service contracts until the 1978 case of Rhodes v.
California Hospital Medical Center.56 In Rhodes, the California Court of
Appeals refused to force the husband and son of a decedent to arbitrate their
action for the wrongful death of their wife and mother.5" Although the decedent,
in contracting medical services for herself, had agreed to submit to arbitration any
claims that should arise, the court noted that neither the husband nor the son "ever
contracted to forego their rights to have their cause of action determined in a
normal judicial proceeding.""8
Concerning itself only with the forum in which the action was to be brought,
the court refused to address the merits of the claim.59 While the Rhodes court
noted that a wrongful death action is derivative to the substance of any action
brought, the decedent's agreement to arbitrate her possible claims was found
ineffective to "bar the constitutional and procedural rights of the decedent's heirs
in their own, independent action.,
60
While acknowledging the strong public policy enunciated in Madden in favor
of arbitration agreements in medical service contracts, the court distinguished
Rhodes from cases such as Doyle and Madden.6 In those cases, the party
bringing the suit was bound by an agreement made by someone else, acting on
their behalf, while contracting for the services which were the subject of the
action.62 In Rhodes, the plaintiffs were not the signatories and had not authorized
the decedent to contract on their behalf.
63
In Hawkins v. Superior Court," the California Court of Appeals made this
distinction more explicit. In Hawkins, a wife was forced to arbitrate her claim for
the wrongful death of her husband, where the husband had contracted to receive
services on behalf of himself and his wife. 65 In addition, the agreement provided
that the heirs of the health care plan member would be required to submit their
claims to arbitration.66
Distinguishing the case from Rhodes, where the individual patient contracted
for medical services for herself only, the Hawkins court extended the reach of
Doyle and Madden to suits initiated by a person whose spouse did the
contracting.67 While acknowledging that California's "strong public policy
56. 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
57. Id. at 60.






64. 152 Cal Rptr. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
65. Id. at 495.
66. Id.
67. Id. a 494-95.
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favoring arbitration . .. cannot displace the necessity for an agreement to
arbitrate," and that "[a] person cannot be compelled to accept arbitration of a
dispute he has not agreed to submit to arbitration," the court nevertheless forced
the wife to arbitrate her claim, even though she never agreed to be bound by the
arbitration agreement and had not authorized her husband to do so on her
behalf." The court stated that the "[diecedent had the power to contract for the
health plan for himself and his wife and, as in Doyle as viewed by Madden,
implicit in that power is the implied authority to agree for himself and his wife
to arbitrate claims arising out of medical malpractice."'69 The Hawkins court
found that the implied power of spouses to contract for one another arose from
their mutual obligations to care for and support one another.70
The Hawkins court placed great emphasis on the fact that both the husband
and the wife were "beneficiaries" of the medical services contract entered into by
the husband." The court expressly refused to address the question of whether
the arbitration provision would have been binding upon heirs who were not
members of the agreement.72
In Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,73 the California Court of Appeals
dealt with facts similar to those presented in Pietrelli. In Wilson, the court
reversed a trial court order that refused to compel arbitration of a plaintiff-child's
medical malpractice claim for prenatal negligence.74 According to the court, the
agreement signed by the child's mother as part of her health care plan
automatically enrolled plaintiff as a "member" upon birth." It further provided
that medical malpractice claims for bodily injury of "members" of the health care
plan were to be arbitrated.76
In rejecting plaintiffs argument that he was not alive, and thus, not a
"member" subject to the arbitration agreement signed by his mother, the court
characterizedplaintiff's effort to avoid arbitration as an attempt to "assert a right
to the benefits under the agreementbut to avoid the consequences which attach to
the acceptance of benefits."77 In reversing the trial court's order, the Wilson
court determined that prior to actualbirth, the fetus was not a person for purposes
of tort law, and that a cause of action did not arise on its behalf until it was born
alive.78 The arbitration agreement bound the child because any cause of action
68. Id. at 493.
69. Id. at 495.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 495 n.5.
73. 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. CL App. 1983).
74. Id. at 650.
75. Id. at 651-52.
76. Id. at 651.
77. Id. at 654.
78. Id. at 653.
1994]
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that he had arose at the time of his birth, the same moment he became a member
of the health plan under the terms of his mother's health care contract.79
The Wilson court stated that the case was essentially analogous to Doyle, and,
as such, was governed by the same principles of law and policy.80 The court also
implied that it would not have compelled arbitration of the plaintiffs claim if the
injuries had resulted under facts similar to Rhodes, where the signatory to the
agreement had contracted for services for herself only, rather than under a family
health care plan."' Finally, the Wilson court emphasized the importance to be
placed on the language of the agreement itself, hinting that it would not enforce
an agreement which did not specifically contemplate the addition or inclusion of
third parties, including newborn children.' Similar analysis was applied in
Pietrelli.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The issue presented in Pietrelli was "whether plaintiff was bound by an
arbitration agreement which was signed by his mother at a time when plaintiff was
both unborn and unconceived."Os In determining the scope of the arbitration
clause, the court looked first to the language of the contract that Ms. Pietrelli had
signed., The agreement called for arbitration of any controversy between the
doctor and "persons born or unborn" on behalf of whom she had the power to
contract.
85
Pietrelli made two arguments which the court addressed. First, he argued that
at the time of the agreement, he was not a "person, born or unborn," as provided
for by the terms of the contract, and was thus outside its scope.86 Second, he
attacked the power of a parent to bind someone to arbitration who does not exist
as a legal entity at the time of the contract.87 In rejecting Pietrelli's contention
that he was not a party explicitly covered by the language of the agreement, the
court looked to the intent of the parties in light of the contract language used and
the circumstances surrounding its formation. 8 The court noted that public policy
in California favored arbitration and that the agreement complied with the
79. Id. at 654.
80. Id. "The logic of identical treatment for the unborn child and the already born child is
evident since neither a fetus nor a minor has capacity to contract for the necessary medical services
on his or her own behalf, and must do so through an authorized representative." Id.
81. Id. at 655.
82. Id.
83. Pietrelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688.
84. Id. at 689.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 690.
88. Id. at 689.
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requirements of Section 1295.89 As such, subsection (c) of Section 1295
provided that since the contract was not rescinded by written notice, it was
ongoing and governed all transactions subsequent to its signing.90 The language
of the agreement determined its scope, and the agreement bound "persons, born
or unborn."9' Even though Pietrelli was not an "unborn person" at the time the
agreement was signed, he became one at the moment of his conception, and thus,
was bound by the contract terms,92 provided Ms. Pietrelli had power to contract
on his behalf.93
In disposing of Pietrelli's second argument, the court noted that the law
recognizes in other contexts the power of one party to act on behalf of and affect
the rights of persons not yet in existence.94 As an example, the court cited
provisions made for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for beneficiaries of a
testamentary bequest who are not ascertained or are not parties yet in being.95
The court found that the principles which required arbitration in Wilson also
applied in the present case.96 Thus, "by electing to receive the obstetric services
provided for under the agreement, Ms. Pietrelli impliedly agreed to arbitration for
her unborn child."97 Once Pietrelli became an unborn person as defined by the
contract, any claims he might have to bring were governed by its terms.98
V. COMMENT
The California Court of Appeal's approach in Pietrelli was basically to give
expression to the intent of the parties as indicated in the language of the contract
signed by Ms. Pietrelli. Once the court determined what it perceived to be the
intent of the parties, it had only to place the child within the scope of the
agreement. In doing so, the court was guided by the policies and parameters
expressed in the legislation and case law.
A summary of these parameters follows. First, California has a strong public
policy favoring and facilitating private arbitration agreements.' Second, where




92. Id. at 690.
93. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.




98. Id. at 690-91.
99. See CAL Civ. PROc. CoDm § 1295 (West 1982); Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 552
P.2d 1178, 1182 (Cal. 1986); Gross v. Recabaren, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
100. See, e.g., Madden, 552 P.2d 1178.
1994]
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or a spouse, 1°2 who is legally authorized to act on behalf of the non-signatory
- the clause will be enforced unless the situation surrounding formation is
unconscionable. 0 3 Finally, where the non-signatory is not a party to the contract
and was not entitled to receive medical care under it, separate claims deriving
from injuries to the signatory might or might not have to be arbitrated, depending
on the jurisdiction which has control over the dispute. 4  The Pietrelli court
relied on the fiduciary rationale outlined above to bring the plaintiff within the
scope of the agreement. In doing so, the court embraced the pre-MICRA case of
Doyle v. Giuliucci for the rule that gave Ms. Pietrelli the authority, by virtue of
her fiduciary capacity as guardian, to contract for medical services on behalf of
the plaintiff. The policy reasons supporting the Doyle rule are compelling.
Parents should have the power to contract on their children's behalf to ensure the
availability of medical services. Minors are incompetent to contract for
themselves; because of this, health care providers might be unwilling to provide
medical care if the contract specifying the terms under which care is provided
could be repudiated by the child through the guardian when legally advantageous.
In order to apply the Doyle rule, which on its face applies only to children
in existence, to the facts of Pietrelli, where plaintiff was not a legal person at the
time the agreement was signed, the court made a comparison to testamentary
bequests where the law allows a guardian ad litem to represent a party not yet in
being. There are, however, some problems with the logic of the opinion. Most
testamentary dispositions do not involve "rights." If they do, the guardian is
appointed to protect something, usually a property interest conferred by the
disposition. On the other hand, a medical service contract containing an
arbitration clause takes away a right that the child would already possess if born
alive; namely, the right to a jury trial." 5 Of course, the substantive right of the
child to bring an action is not forfeited by an arbitration agreement, which merely
101. See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1. See also Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.,
190 Cal. Rptr. 649.
102. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491.
103. See the discussion of Madden, supra notes 46-55, and accompanying text. But see CAL.
ClV. PPoc. CODE § 1295(e), under which an arbitration clause that complies with the requirements of
the statute is presumptively not of adhesion.
104. See Rhodes v. California Hosp. Medical Ctr., 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. CL App. 1978)
(wife's binding arbitration agreement entered into to provide services for only herself does not limit
husband's wrongful death action); accord. Baker v. Birnbaum, 248 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Cal. CL App. 1988)
(wife's contract for medical services for only herself does not require her husband to arbitrate his loss
of consortium claim arising out of those services). Contra Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209
(Cal. CL App. 1991) (husband is forced to arbitrate an emotional distress claim for injuries allegedly
sustained by wife even though the wife alone contracted for the services); Gross v. Recabaren, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (wife is required to arbitrate her loss of consortium claim even though
her husband contracted for services for himself only); Herbert v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 477
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (non-minor children must arbitrate their action for the wrongful death of their
mother even though the children were not beneficiaries of medical services under the contract). See
generally Ward, supra note 7, at 382.
105. Doyle, 401 P.2d at 3. A minor is authorized to enforce his rights by civil action in the
same manner as an adult, provided a guardian or guardian ad litem is appointed. Id.
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preselects the forum in which those rights will be adjudicated. But given the fact
that the body acting as the trier of fact can make a crucial difference in
determining the results of legal disputes, the court's analogy has its limits.
Much more compelling is the court's relianceon Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals.0 6 The Wilson case emphasized the fact that the arbitration agreement
specifically contemplated the addition of children, not born at the time of its
signing, to the health care plan. In Wilson, the agreement provided newborn
children would automatically become members of the health care plan at birth.
Similarly, in Pietrelli, the agreement specifically contemplated the inclusion of
unborn persons who Ms. Pietrelli had authority to bind. This being the case, "[alt
the moment of his conception, plaintiff became an 'unborn person' within the
definition set forth in the contract."'17
This reasoning makes sense given the existence of a public policy favoring
arbitration as an inexpensive and expeditious means of resolving malpractice
disputes. Further, arbitration encourages freedom of contract insofar as it allows
the parties to determine the scope of their own agreement. This reasoning does
not, however, make explicit the other rational operative in Wilson; namely, that
it was fair to hold the child to the agreement because he received medical care
under it.'05 As in Wilson, the court in Pietrelli noted that by electing to receive
obstetric care under the agreement, Pietrelli should be held to have impliedly
consented to its terms. 109 This seems fair because otherwise, a party could
receive benefits under a medical services agreement while avoiding the
consequences inherent in the acceptance of those benefits; namely, submission to
arbitration of claims arising out of the services rendered." 0
There is nothing in the factual or procedural background of the case to
indicate that Ms. Pietrelli was either "tricked" into signing away her future child's
right to a jury trial or that the contract was formed in an unconscionable manner.
Where the rights of a non-signatory are concerned, it is far from clear that courts
would be willing to enforce the agreement."' Although compliance with the
Section 1295 requirements, concerning the language and format of the arbitration
agreement within the medical services contract, creates a statutory presumption
that the contract is not unconscionable," 2 the case law indicates that the courts
have developed parameters defining and limiting the scope of agreements that will
be enforced."'
The Pietrelli court indicated its inclusion among those courts which would
force non-signatories, who were not at the same time direct beneficiaries of
106. 190 CaL Rptr. 649.
107. Pietrelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
108. Wilson, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
109. Pietrelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
110. See Wilson, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
111. See Madden, 552 P.2d at 1182-83.
112. CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 1295(e) (West 1982).
113. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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services under the agreement, to arbitrate claims deriving from injuries to the
signatory," 4 but this dicta was not necessary to the court's decision. Pietrelli
was represented by a fiduciary, his mother, who was authorized to contract on his
behalf. In addition, he was the recipient of obstetric care under the agreement.
It seems more fair to bind him to the agreement as a consequence of receiving
such benefits than it would be to bind someone who had not.
VI. CONCLUSION
California courts have developed a set ofjudicial rules which both give effect
to a state policy favoring arbitration agreements in medical service contracts and
allow the parties to determine the scope of that agreement. The extent to which
the health care recipients are free to negotiate the terms of the agreement is
debateable, but the courts have recognized the potential injustice of requiring
arbitration in all cases, and have developed persuasive reasons for extending the
scope of the agreement when binding non-signatories, including unborn children.
The desirability and success of judicial and legislative facilitation of arbitration
agreements as a panacea for the perceived medical malpractice crises is also
debateable, but the enforcement of properly formed agreements, against signatories
and third party non-signatories who received care under the agreement and were
representedby fiduciaries, seems fair and is consistent with a state policy favoring
the use of arbitration in the resolution of such disputes.
MARK PRLEY KROEKER
114. Pietrelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690 n.I.
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